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A qualitative study of equine veterinarians and allied 
staff from Queensland, Australia, showed that veterinarians 
are ceasing equine practice because of fears related to 
Hendra virus. Their decisions were motivated by personal 
safety and legal liability concerns.
In the mid-1990s, Hendra virus (HeV) emerged as a new pathogen that spilled over from bats to horses to 
humans (1,2). All 7 cases of HeV infection among humans 
in Australia occurred in Queensland. Five of these cases 
involved equine veterinary personnel who conducted 
routine necropsies or endoscopies; 3 of the 5 cases were 
fatal (2–6). In Australia, equine clinical services are mostly 
delivered by veterinarians working in private practice. The 
3 deaths prompted government and veterinary professional 
agencies to promote the overhaul of infection-control 
measures in veterinary practice (3,4) and increase auditing 
of veterinary infection-control strategies in private equine 
practice by Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (7). 
In 2011, HeV outbreaks multiplied throughout Queensland 
and New South Wales, and samples from a dog were 
positive for HeV (8,9).
With the approval of the James Cook University 
Human Ethics Committee (permit H3513), we interviewed 
veterinarians and allied staff from veterinary practices with 
the aim of capturing the HeV-related infection-control 
and workplace health and safety issues faced by equine 
practices. We report on 1 unexpected emerging issue: the 
departure of veterinarians from equine practice as a result 
of HeV outbreaks.
The Study
During 2009–2010, we conducted face-to-face, in-
depth interviews with 21 veterinarians and allied staff 
from 14 equine and mixed private veterinary practices 
from a range of urban and rural areas between Cairns and 
Brisbane, Queensland, Australia (Table 1) (10). We asked 
a series of open-ended questions to determine what HeV-
related infection-control and workplace health and safety 
issues confront equine practices (Table 2). Interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for themes. 
Of the 20 veterinary professionals interviewed, 12 
(60%) had dealt with >1 suspected cases of HeV, and 7 
(35%) had dealt with a confi rmed case of HeV. Of the 18 
veterinarians interviewed, 4 (22%) reported having ceased 
equine practice, and as many as 8 (44%) knew of >1 
colleagues who had done so in the previous 12 months. The 
decisions to quit were mostly motivated by the HeV-related 
fear for personal safety and legal liability. 
Under the current Queensland legislation governing 
private businesses, private veterinarians are responsible for 
the safety of all persons in their workplace, both in the clinic 
and the fi eld (11). Ten (47.6%) of the study participants 
were principal veterinarians (Table 1) who carried the 
highest degree of legal responsibility within their veterinary 
practice; they were quite concerned about their HeV-
related legal liability. Four of these principal veterinarians 
reported ceasing equine practice because of the diffi culty 
in enforcing infection control–related workplace health and 
safety compliance among their staff, because the logistical 
outlay of bringing change to their practice was too costly, 
or both. One participant declared, “The HeV situation was 
the last straw that made us stop equine practice…. We put 
it in the too hard basket.” Their fear of prosecution became 
too big a threat for their business. However, ceasing this 
high-risk activity does not result in improved infection-
control standards.
Principal veterinarians from other practices preferred 
to personally deal with all equine patients, thus taking 
the highest risk themselves rather than putting their staff 
at risk or not providing the service. In some instances, 
staff and principal veterinarians resorted to working in 
suboptimal personal safety conditions to fulfi ll their legal 
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Table 1. Location of participants in a study of Hendra virus–
related safety issues faced by equine practices, Queensland, 
Australia, 2009–2010* 
Zone, category No. (%) participants 
Metropolitan zone  
 Capital cities 3 (14.30) 
 Population >100,000 6 (28.55) 
Rural zone  
 Population 25,000–99,999 6 (28.55) 
 Population 10,000–24,999 0 
 Population <10,000 3 (14.30) 
Remote zone  
 Population >4,999 3 (14.30) 
 Population <5,000 0 
*Location zones and categories are according to the Australian Rural, 
Remote and Metropolitan Areas classification system (10).
and ethical responsibility to their patients and clients, thus 
jeopardizing the legal situation. As one participant pointed 
out, “Veterinarians usually end up with less authority… 
taking the risk out of concern for the welfare of the horse.” 
Veterinarians have a legal right to refuse service if safety 
is compromised; however, this would mean forfeiting 
immediate and future income through the loss of a client(s) 
and, possibly, reputation. In such instances, the staff and 
the business remain safe, but the principal veterinarian may 
not, and the overall standards of infection control within 
the practice do not improve. 
Up to 6 (60%) of the interviewed principal 
veterinarians had embraced the need for improvement of 
infection-control practices and had made major changes 
to their protocols and premises, but they felt that the 
best level of compliance would not be legally protective 
because of the unpredictable character of the veterinary 
work environment. Another participant expressed concern 
over this legal uncertainty: “You still have to worry about 
what might occur out of the blue…. With workplace health 
and safety we are very aware that complying is often not 
enough if an incident occurs.” In this scenario, although 
safety improvement is achieved, the legal risk remains.
Those participants still in equine practice also 
expressed concern over the consequences that the loss of 
skilled equine veterinarians would have on the profession 
and their practice. One participant said, “… this might 
introduce problems of gaps in the welfare of animals. 
Vets will need to refer animals.” The lack of equine 
specialists would increase demands on the remaining 
equine veterinarians, who would have to further extend 
their already overstretched time and resources: they would 
work longer hours, travel farther to provide services, 
and be unable to reach sick horses in remote locations or 
to have them tested in a timely fashion. Participants still 
in equine practice considered that all these factors made 
working with horses less safe. Indeed, several studies 
showed that across a wide range of sectors, working >60 
hours/week increased the risks for occupational injury and 
illness (12–14). Furthermore, several study participants 
reported that some colleagues now choose to only provide 
services to healthy animals and refuse to treat sick horses. 
A participant described this as choosing the “easy safe 
money” over the “hard dangerous money.” This choice 
was creating resentment among members of an otherwise 
tight-knit veterinary community. Over time, resentment 
could jeopardize professional networking, which seems to 
play an essential role in disseminating clinical and safety 
information among veterinarians.
Although this study did not measure the overall effect 
of the decreased number of veterinarians who treat equids 
in Queensland, participants viewed the decrease as a major 
source of increased occupational risk for the remaining 
equine practitioners. If this trend is sustained, more private 
veterinarians may cease equine practice. Other participants 
no longer regarded themselves as equine practitioners and 
declared that they had ceased equine practice; however, 
they later admitted to still regularly treating horses. Their 
“offi cial” departure from equine practice would increase 
their safety and legal risks because they might miss 
program updates on equine health information or infection-
control improvement. It is also possible that the perception 
of increased risk may adversely infl uence the decision by 
younger veterinarians to pursue work in equine practice, 
thereby jeopardizing the normal replacement of the existing 
pool of aging equine practitioners. One parallel was the 
effect of severe acute respiratory syndrome. Overall, 35% 
of severe acute respiratory syndrome–related deaths were 
in health care workers. Some workers refused to go to work 
and others adopted a heroic stance and continued to work, 
resulting in substantial medium-term psychological effects 
on the healthcare professionals (15).
Conclusions
HeV remains a threat to the veterinary profession 
and public health in Australia. The experimental success 
of an HeV vaccine for horses was recently announced; if 
a vaccine becomes available, it may re-instill confi dence 
in existing and future equine practitioners (9). However, 
the potential that emerging infectious diseases might 
dismantle the veterinary workforce should be considered 
when developing offi cial strategies for the management of 
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Table 2. Demographic characteristic of participants in a study of Hendra virus–related safety issues faced by equine practitioners,
Queensland, Australia, 2009–2010 
Study 
participants No. (%) 
Age, y 
(range)* 
Years since 
graduation*
(range)† 
% Time spent 
doing equine 
work* (range)‡ 
Distribution by job title, no. (%) 
Principal
veterinarian
Partner/associate or 
employee veterinarian 
Veterinary 
nurse 
Practice
manager
Female 8 (38.1) 35.8 (31–48) 13.1 (4–27) 30.4 (2–95)§ 1 (4.8) 5 (23.8) 2 (9.5) 0 
Male 13 (61.9) 48.5 (28–63) 22.9 (4–40) 52.1 (2–100)¶ 9 (42.8) 3 (14.3) 0 1 (4.8) 
Total 21 (100.0) 42.2 (28–63) 19.0 (4–40) 47.3 (2–100) 10 (47.6) 8 (38.1) 2 (9.5) 1 (4.8) 
*Average. 
†The practice manager interviewed was not a veterinarian and did not wish to supply this information. 
‡Self-reported. 
§One female participant did not provide this information. 
¶The 1 participant who was a practice manager but not a veterinarian had not spent any time with animals and therefore was not included. 
Hendra Virus Outbreaks and Veterinarians
HeV outbreaks. Infection-control management guidelines 
and workplace health and safety regulations must consider 
the context in which services are feasibly delivered to the 
public and should be devised in consultation with the private 
veterinary professionals on the frontline of outbreaks.
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